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Abstract		In	recent	years,	far	from	arguing	that	evolutionary	approaches	to	our	own	species	permit	us	to	describe	the	fundamental	character	of	human	nature,	a	prominent	group	of	cultural	evolutionary	theorists	has	instead	argued	that	the	very	idea	of	‘human	nature’	is	one	we	should	reject.	It	makes	no	sense,	they	argue,	to	speak	of	human	nature	in	opposition	to	human	culture.		The	very	same	sceptical	arguments	have	also	led	some	thinkers	–	usually	from	social	anthropology	–	to	dismiss	the	intimately	related	idea	that	we	can	talk	of	human	culture	in	opposition	to	human	nature.	How,	then,	are	we	supposed	to	understand	the	cultural	evolutionary	project	itself,	whose	proponents	seem	to	deny	the	distinction	between	human	nature	and	human	culture,	while	simultaneously	relying	on	a	closely	allied	distinction	between	‘genetic’	(or	sometimes	‘organic’)	evolution	and	‘cultural’	evolution?	This	paper	defends	the	cultural	evolutionary	project	against	the	charge	that,	in	refusing	to	endorse	the	concept	of	human	nature,	it	has	inadvertently	sabotaged	itself.		
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The	C	Word		Cultural	evolutionists—at	least	the	ones	I	focus	on	in	this	paper—are	a	diverse	group	of	researchers	who	are	interested	in	broad	questions	about	the	abilities	of	some	organisms	to	learn	from	others.	[1,	2,	3]	They	mainly,	but	by	no	means	exclusively,	focus	on	human	organisms.	[4,	5]	For	example,	they	might	ask	how	we	need	to	supplement	traditional	evolutionary	models	that	focus	on	the	changing	genetic	profiles	of	species,	when	we	realise	that	change	and	stasis	in	populations	can	be	produced	by	forms	of	learning,	as	well	as	by	well	known	evolutionary	processes	like	genetic	drift	and	natural	selection.	[6]	They	might	ask	why	the	capacity	for	culture	emerged	in	the	first	place,	and	what	evolutionary	rationale	might	account	for	the	precise	features	of	how	we	learn	from	others.	More	specifically,	they	might	ask	what	explains	our	tendency	to	attend	to	particular	types	of	organisms,	and	what	explains	our	tendency	to	find	some	features	of	what	we	attend	to	especially	memorable,	while	others	are	hard	to	learn.	[7,	8,	9]	They	might	try	to	document	and	account	for	the	differences	in	cultural	capacities	displayed	by	different	species,	and	they	might	try	to	explain	what	allows	populations	to	sustain	cultural	traditions,	and	to	build	increasingly	elaborate	and	effective	bodies	of	know-how,	over	time.	[10,	11]		None	of	these	projects	demands	that	we	think	of	beliefs,	behaviours,	neural	states,	or	whatever	as	engaged	in	a	Darwinian	struggle	for	existence	(although	sometimes	they	may	be).	Nor	do	they	demand	that	we	conceive	of	these	items	in	ways	that	make	them	close	analogues	of	genetic	replicators.	[12]	These	forms	of	‘cultural	selectionism’	in	general,	and	‘memetics’	in	particular,	are	just	some	of	the	ways	in	which	we	might	try	to	understand	social	phenomena	of	learning,	tradition,	or	the	acquisition	of	know-how,	from	an	evolutionary	perspective.	In	spite	of	these	differences	between	the	sub-varieties	of	cultural	evolutionism,	cultural	evolutionists	do,	more	or	less	invariably,	frame	their	questions	in	terms	of	coming	to	an	understanding	of	culture:	how	does	it	work,	what	is	it	for,	why	are	we	so	good	at	it?	Here	lies	one	source	of	conflict	between	natural	scientific	and	social	scientific	approaches	to	what	goes	on	in	human	groups.	Many	social	scientists—especially	social	anthropologists—have	grown	suspicious	of	the	very	
idea	of	culture.	The	job	for	this	essay	is	to	understand	what	some	of	the	sources	are	for	this	suspicion	of	culture	itself,	and	to	ask	what	trouble	this	creates	for	the	cultural	evolutionary	project.	The	answer	is	that	it	leaves	that	project	largely	intact,	but	not	wholly	unscathed.		In	particular,	I	want	to	illustrate	one	source	of	tension	with	respect	to	how	cultural	evolutionists	use	the	culture	concept	and	how	that	notion	relates	to	the	idea	of	human	nature.	The	concept	of	human	nature	is	innocuous	if	it	merely	draws	attention	to	general	truths	about	what	humans	are	like,	compared	with	general	truths	about	what	other	species	are	like.	[13]	So	we	might	say	in	a	casual	way	that	‘Lemurs	have	prehensile	tails;	humans	do	not’;	or	perhaps	‘Many	adult	humans	can	digest	lactose;	the	adults	of	other	mammalian	species	cannot.’	These	ways	of	picking	out	truths	about	what	humans	(and	other	species)	are	like	are	not	threatened	by	the	facts	that	not	all	humans	can	digest	lactose,	and	not	all	lemurs	have	prehensile	tails.	The	point	of	these	assertions	is	to	draw	contrasts	between	striking	traits	that	are	systematically	present	in	one	group,	but	not	in	the	other.	That	does	not	mean	that	all	uses	of	‘human	nature’	are	so	unobjectionable,	especially	when	we	use	‘human	nature’	not	in	contrast	with	the	nature	of	other	species,	but	when	we	contrast	it	with	‘human	culture’.	[14]		Partly	in	defence	of	their	conviction	that	various	forms	of	learning	are,	and	have	long	been,	of	great	importance	in	shaping	many	of	the	characteristic	traits	of	our	species	members,	several	very	prominent	cultural	evolutionists	have	argued	that	the	very	idea	of	human	nature—when	the	notion	is	contrasted	with	human	culture—is	one	we	should	abandon.	To	give	just	one	example,	Cecilia	Heyes	has	made	an	empirical	case	for	thinking	that	the	capacity	of	humans	to	imitate	others	is	a	capacity	that	is	itself	acquired	by	learning	from	others.	[15,	16,	17]	Heyes	is	no	sceptic	regarding	the	idea	of	human	nature	in	general.	Instead,	her	view	is	that	‘human	nature’	names	all	those	evolved	mechanisms	that	are	responsible	for	the	cognitive	and	behavioural	traits	that	are	typical	of	our	species,	regardless	of	what	form	those	evolutionary	processes	take,	and	what	kind	of	inheritance	processes	they	rely	on.	[18]	Heyes’s	empirical	work	suggests	that	the	capacity	to	imitate	is	an	element	of	human	culture,	in	that	its	reliable	development	and	
transmission	owes	itself	to	social	interaction.	This	is	also,	however,	a	capacity	that	is	very	widely	present	across	all	human	populations,	which	seems	especially	well	developed	in	humans,	and	which	may	explain	some	distinctive	features	of	human	history	compared	with	the	histories	of	other	species.	If	Heyes	is	right,	it	seems	that	we	should	say	that	imitation	is	both	a	part	of	human	culture	and	a	part	of	human	nature.	That,	in	turn,	means	that	even	if	we	do	not	need	to	give	up	on	the	idea	of	human	nature,	we	do	need	to	give	up	on	the	idea	that	human	nature	and	human	culture	are	categories	that	mark	out	different	classes	of	traits.		We	have	seen	that	a	prominent	group	of	cultural	evolutionists	have	argued	that	the	very	idea	of	human	nature	is	a	confusion;	but	now	the	question	arises	of	whether	this	critique	of	the	nature/culture	distinction	is	damaging	to	the	cultural	evolutionary	project	itself.	For	if	it	makes	no	sense	to	talk	of	‘human	nature’	in	a	way	that	distinguishes	it	from	‘human	culture’,	then	it	also	makes	no	sense	to	talk	of	‘human	culture’	in	a	way	that	distinguishes	it	from	‘human	nature’.	One	might	then	worry	about	how	cultural	evolutionists	can	possibly	articulate	their	research	project—which,	as	we	have	seen,	is	usually	framed	in	terms	of	a	series	of	questions	about	the	adaptive	advantages	conferred	by	the	capacity	for	culture,	and	about	the	ways	in	which	cultural	and	genetic	transmission	affect	each	other—without	falling	foul	of	the	very	distinction	they	so	often	attack.	The	worry,	in	short,	is	that	in	attacking	the	very	idea	of	human	nature,	cultural	evolutionists	have	shot	themselves	in	the	foot.		As	I	have	already	indicated,	I	do	not	think	the	cultural	evolutionary	project	is	fatally	damaged	by	worries	about	whether	we	can	distinguish	nature	and	culture.	Instead	I	want	to	suggest	that,	first,	understanding	these	worries	about	the	nature/culture	relation	can	help	us	to	better	appreciate	some	of	the	sources	of	scepticism	of	the	cultural	evolutionary	project	voiced	by	those	social	anthropologists	who	have	long	been	suspicious	of	the	culture	concept;	second,	that	some	of	these	worries	are	already	appreciated	by	those	working	in	cultural	evolution	itself;	and	third,	that	the	cultural	evolutionary	project	is	profiting	from	more	nuanced	understandings	of	the	difficulties	inherent	in	distinguishing	nature	from	culture.	
	
On	Human	Nature		The	historian	Roger	Smith	remarked	ten	years	ago	that,	‘Modern	evolutionary	accounts	of	human	origins	continue	to	reflect	the	belief	that	there	is	an	essential	human	nature,	the	nature	all	people	share	through	their	common	root’.	[19,	p.	27]	While	this	may	have	been	true	of	some	evolutionary	approaches	to	humans,	it	was—and	still	is—by	no	means	true	of	all	of	them.	In	particular,	a	small	handful	of	the	most	prominent	evolutionary	thinkers	have	denied	the	value	of	the	very	idea	of	human	nature.	In	a	forthcoming	publication,	Kevin	Laland	and	Gillian	Brown	express	their	scepticism	in	a	very	general	way:	[20]		 There	may	be	(‘universal’,	or	at	least	‘typical’)	human	traits	that	are	relatively	stable	across	environments	and	cultures,	but	these	derive	their	stability	not	solely	from	inherited	genes	but	equally	from	extra-genetic	inheritance,	including	constructive	environmental/cultural	processes.		Here,	I	take	it	that	Laland	and	Brown—well	known	for	their	advocacy	of	the	niche-construction	perspective	on	evolution—are	using	a	set	of	arguments	very	similar	to	those	put	forward	by	advocates	of	Developmental	Systems	Theory	(DST)	in	an	effort	to	cast	doubt	on	the	idea	that	it	makes	sense	to	distinguish	that	which	we	owe	to	a	shared	nature,	from	that	which	we	owe	to	local	culture.	DST—the	view	of	development	and	evolution	pioneered	by	Paul	Griffiths,	Russell	Gray	and	Susan	Oyama—does	not	deny	that	genes	can	often	have	thoroughly	stable	effects	on	developmental	outcomes	over	generations,	of	the	sort	that	make	alternative	alleles	subject	to	natural	selection	in	just	the	way	stressed	by	mainstream	evolutionary	theorising.	[21-26]	Instead	they	caution	that	this	stability	of	genetic	effects	is	only	possible	because	of	the	stable	developmental	context	in	which	those	genes	act.	Since	that	developmental	context	itself	includes	stable	features	of	environmental	context	whose	very	stability	is	a	product	of	the	collective	behaviours	of	previous	generations,	we	need	to	acknowledge	that	every	trait	is	simultaneously	‘genetic’	and	‘cultural’.	It	is	for	these	sorts	of	reasons	that	Laland	and	Brown’s	recent	article	builds	to	the	conclusion	that	
human	nature	is	quite	literally	socially	constructed:	more-or-less	universal	and	stable	features	of	human	phenotypes—the	very	traits	we	are	tempted	to	think	of	as	elements	of	human	nature—are	also	artefacts	of	human	culture.		At	this	point	I	have	neither	endorsed	nor	attacked	Laland	and	Brown’s	argument.	My	goal,	so	far,	is	merely	to	point	out	that	at	least	one	pair	of	researchers	with	a	very	prominent	commitment	to	the	programme	of	cultural	evolution	is	also	committed	to	drawing	on	DST	to	argue	against	the	nature/culture	distinction.	This	also	means	that	it	should	be	no	surprise	that	thinkers	from	social	anthropology	have	detected	an	instability	in	the	cultural	evolutionary	programme.	Christina	Toren	remarks	that	the	‘culture–biology’		distinction	has	long	been	considered	problematic	among	researchers	in	social	anthropology.	[27]	Maurice	Bloch	complains	about	work	done	by	gene-culture	coevolutionists,	on	the	grounds	that	culture	and	genetics	are	not	distinct	forces	that	can	influence	each	other,	but	instead	need	to	be	thought	of	as	‘	a	unified	process’.	[28,	p.	52]	Finally,	Tim	Ingold	characterizes	humans	as	‘biosocial	becomings’:	once	again	in	an	effort	to	reject	any	separation	of	what	is	biological	or	genetic	from	what	is	cultural	or	social.	[29]		The	apparent	problem	for	cultural	evolution	lies	in	the	way	that	research	programmes	in	‘dual	inheritance	theory’	or	‘gene-culture	coevolution’—both	more	or	less	synonymous	labels	for	a	highly	influential	element	of	the	cultural	evolutionary	project—are	sometimes	framed.	Research	in	these	traditions	aims	to	track	the	impact	of	cultural	change	on	genetic	evolution,	and	the	reciprocal	changes	wrought	by	genetic	change	on	culture.	Perhaps	the	best	known	example	of	this	type	of	research	concerns	the	coevolution	of	pastoralism	and	lactose	tolerance.	[30]	In	rough	terms,	the	basic	hypothesis—which	is	widely	accepted	and	well	confirmed—is	that	the	adoption	of	dairying	set	up	a	modified	niche	in	which	the	ability	to	digest	lactose	into	adulthood	was	at	an	advantage.		With	dairying	in	place,	our	ancestors	who	were	lactose	tolerant	could	take	advantage	of	a	new	source	of	calories.	Hence	it	is	the	learned	acquisition	of	dairying	which	explains	the	natural	selection	of	genes	favouring	lactase-persistence,	i.e.	the	continued	production	of	the	enzyme	lactase	beyond	weaning.	[31-32]	
	This	result—along	with	many	others	in	this	genre	of	research—is	often	expressed	using	the	language	of	distinct	inheritance	‘channels’;	hence	‘dual	inheritance	theory’.	Dairying	is	inherited,	so	the	story	goes,	via	a	cultural	channel;	lactase	persistence	is	inherited	via	a	genetic	channel.	The	research	question	for	dual-inheritance	theory	is	to	ask	how	these	channels	influence	each	other.	Sometimes,	researchers	even	go	so	far	as	to	distinguish	between	genetic	and	cultural	traits,	as	when	Holden	and	Mace,	in	their	widely	cited	paper	on	lactose	tolerance,	write	that	‘…lactase	persistence	is	a	genetic	trait,	whereas	pastoralism	and	milk-drinking	are	cultural	traits’.	[30]	Generalising	from	this	specific	example,	Laland	and	collaborators	write	that	‘Cultural	evolutionists	tend	to	view	natural	selection	and	cultural	evolution	as	providing	competing	ultimate	explanations’.	[33,	p.	1515]	This	suggests	that	it	makes	sense	to	distinguish	the	biological	process	of	natural	selection	from	the	cultural	processes	that	explain	the	spread	of	practices	like	dairying.	This	all	makes	it	sound,	on	the	surface	of	things	at	least,	as	though	cultural	evolutionists	are	committed	to	a	fairly	strong	distinction	between	what	we	owe	to	nature	and	what	we	owe	to	culture.	How	are	we	supposed	to	square	all	this	with	Laland	and	Brown’s	own	more	recent	insistence	that	‘…it	is	not	possible	to	distinguish	what	is	“biological”	from	what	is	environmental/cultural’?	[20]		
Primary	Resolution		It	is	perhaps	not	surprising	that	some	have	perceived	a	significant	tension	in	a	research	programme	whose	adherents	seem	sometimes	to	insist	that	there	is	no	distinction	between	what	is	biological	and	cultural,	while	elsewhere	asserting	that	we	should	distinguish	between	different	channels	of	inheritance,	between	natural	selection	and	cultural	selection,	or	between	genetic	and	cultural	traits.	I	have	argued	elsewhere	that	this	apparent	tension	is	merely	apparent.	[34]	In	the	case	of	lactose	tolerance,	for	example,	the	coevolutionary	hypothesis	is	committed	only	to	the	claim	that	as	individuals	learned	how	to	milk	cows,	a	new	selection	pressure	was	established	in	which	the	ability	to	profit	from	this	new	source	of	calories	by	digesting	lactose	was	favoured.	This	hypothesis	does	indeed	
require	that	we	can	distinguish	comparatively	rapid	cycles	of	the	reproduction	of	dairying,	which	have	the	ability	to	travel	‘horizontally’	between	non-kin,	from	comparatively	slower	cycles	of	the	reproduction	of	lactase	persistence,	which	instead	travel	‘vertically’	from	parents	to	their	offspring.	In	spite	of	this,	the	basic	content	of	the	coevolutionary	hypothesis	does	not	demand	that	dairying	is	wholly	‘cultural’,	in	the	manifestly	absurd	sense	that	it	hops	from	mind	to	mind,	independent	of	physiological	(and	thereby	genetic)	background.	Evidently	dairying	is	a	complex	skill	requiring	suitable	musculature	and	coordination,	not	to	mention	access	to	cows	themselves.	Dairying	is	not	‘cultural’,	if	one	means	by	this	that	it	is	wholly	or	even	mainly	‘in	the	head’.	Similarly,	the	coevolutionary	hypothesis	does	not	require	that	lactase	persistence	is	wholly	‘genetic’,	in	the	sense	that	its	development	is	unaffected	by	factors	that	vary	across	cultures.	Diet	itself,	for	example,	appears	to	have	an	influence	on	the	ability	to	digest	lactose,	and	on	the	continued	production	of	lactase	into	adulthood.	Gut	trauma,	such	as	gastroenteritis,	can	result	in	loss	of	lactase,	and	social	influence	over	diet	can	evidently	bring	about	such	traumas.	Stress	can	result	in	individuals	who	are	heterozygous	for	genetic	variants	that	normally	result	in	lactase	persistence	experiencing	lactose	intolerance	instead.	[35]	Gut	flora	may	explain	lactose	tolerance	in	Somali	nomads	who	lack	alleles	associated	with	lactase	persistence.	[36]	Finally,	Ruth	Mace	herself	has	pointed	out,	in	some	other	areas	of	Africa	a	comparatively	low	incidence	of	lactose	tolerance	may	be	explained	by	the	adoption	of	techniques	for	processing	milk	that	reduce	the	advantage	of	lactase	persistence.	[37]		Gene-culture	coevolutionary	hypotheses	have	no	need	of	any	strong	distinction	between	that	which	is	genetic	and	that	which	is	cultural,	and	sceptics	of	the	latter	distinction	need	not	be	sceptics	regarding	the	former	research	programme.	Indeed,	this	way	of	having	one’s	cake	and	eating	it	(or,	in	this	case,	having	one’s	milk	and	drinking	it)	has	always	been	part	of	the	Developmental	Systems	Theory	approach,	whose	foundational	papers	made	clear	that	it	can	make	perfect	sense	to	speak	in	terms	of	distinct	inheritance	‘systems’,	so	long	as	we	remember	that	in	talking	of	(for	example)	the	methylation	‘system’	or	the	genetic	‘system’	we	describe	a	set	of	resources	affecting	inheritance—varying	methylation	states,	
varying	genetic	sequences—whose	stable	effects	on	future	cellular	or	organismic	generations	are	contingent	on	the	presence	of	a	whole	developmental	system	by	virtue	of	which	their	phenotypic	expressions	are	robust.	[26]			
Lessons	Learned		The	previous	section	showed	that,	in	spite	of	strong	appearances	to	the	contrary,	it	is	possible	to	pursue	the	kind	of	research	questions	characteristic	of	Dual	Inheritance	Theory	at	the	same	time	as	endorsing	Developmental	Systems	Theory’s	scepticism	of	the	nature/culture	distinction.	The	cultural	evolutionary	project	survives	worries	about	the	inability	to	draw	a	line	between	nature	and	culture.	We	should	not	conclude	from	this	that	the	cultural	evolutionists	have	nothing	to	learn	from	those	who	are	sceptical	of	the	very	idea	of	‘culture’.	We	can	appreciate	this	if	we	begin	by	asking	what	cultural	evolutionists	typically	understand	by	‘culture’.		Richerson	and	Boyd’s	definition	is	fairly	typically	of	the	cultural	evolution	community.	They	tell	us	that	culture	is	‘information	capable	of	affecting	individuals’	behaviour	that	they	acquire	from	other	members	of	their	species	through	teaching,	imitation,	and	other	forms	of	social	learning’.	[3,	p.	5]	So	culture	is	information,	with	a	very	specific	provenance.	I	will	not	worry	here	(although	I	have	done	elsewhere)	about	what	one	might	mean	by	‘information’	in	this	context	[34];	instead,	I	want	to	put	some	pressure	on	how	we	should	understand	‘social	learning’.	This	term	is	important	for	cultural	evolutionists,	because,	in	Richerson	and	Boyd’s	case,	it	is	that	which	is	learned	socially	that	determines	the	scope	of	culture.		We	have	already	seen	that	thinkers	from	the	humanities	and	social	sciences	have	expressed	doubt	about	the	nature/culture	distinction.	They	have	also	expressed	doubt	about	the	related	distinction	between	that	which	is	social	and	that	which	is	individual.	Christina	Toren,	again,	remarks	that	the	very	distinction	between	individual	and	social	learning	is	one	that	social	anthropologists	have	long	regarded	as	problematic.	[27]	
	In	a	useful	paper	on	culture	in	primates,	Andrew	Whiten	points	to	the	variety	of	different	forms	of	social	learning.	[38]	He	notes	that	strict	‘social	learning’	is	a	more	demanding	concept	than	mere	‘social	interaction’.	In	the	case	of	what	psychologists	typically	call	‘stimulus	enhancement’,	for	example,	a	learner’s	attention	is	drawn	to	the	object	or	site	of	the	demonstrator’s	activity.	In	the	case	of	‘local	enhancement’	the	learner	is	attracted	to	the	individual	demonstrator.	In	both	cases,	the	fact	of	being	drawn	to	a	demonstrator,	or	to	the	site	in	which	the	demonstrator	is	located,	can	have	the	result	that	the	learner	ends	up	learning	what	the	demonstrator	has	learned,	but	not	because	the	learner	has	imitated	the	demonstrator.	[39]	There	are,	as	a	consequence,	numerous	ways	in	which	two	apes	may	interact	with	each	other,	such	that	they	learn	similar	things,	but	which	fall	short	of	full-blown	imitation.		Even	so,	Whiten	hints	that	unless	two	apes	actually	meet,	it	cannot	be	appropriate	to	think	of	one	exerting	social	influence	on	the	other.	What	he	calls	‘Non-social	processes’	are	defined	so	as	to	‘include	all	those	cases	that	do	not	even	require	social	interaction	between	A	and	B:	for	example,	two	apes	who	never	meet	but	who	are	faced	with	similar	fruits	in	their	environments,	may	learn	by	their	own	individual	efforts	(individual	learning)	how	to	peel	the	fruit	in	the	same,	perhaps	optimal,	fashion.’	The	structure	of	his	taxonomy	of	learning	processes	makes	clear	that,	in	his	view,	there	can	be	no	cultural	transmission	via	these	‘non-social	processes’.		The	problem	with	this	way	of	defining	things	is	that	we	ignore	the	fact	that	even	when	acting	in	a	manner	that	appears	to	involve	no	direct	interaction	with	other	creatures,	organisms	nonetheless	develop	and	learn	in	environments	that	have	been	affected	by	the	prior	actions	of	their	conspecifics	(and	not	just	their	conspecifics).	This	is	precisely	the	sort	of	phenomenon	stressed	by	the	proponents	of	the	niche-construction	approach	to	evolution,	and	it	is	also	stressed	by	Developmental	Systems	Theorists.	[40-41]	Organisms	grow	in	environments	that	have	been	constructed	by	the	actions	of	previous	generations:	in	that	way,	what	an	organism	learns	can	be	profoundly	affected	and	enhanced	
by	the	collective	activities	of	individuals	it	may	never	meet.	In	other	words,	we	should	not	assume	that	there	is	any	good	distinction	between	individual	learning	and	what	we	might	call	‘social	transmission’.	The	latter	can	be	achieved	via	the	former.		These	considerations	make	problems	for	simple	efforts	to	define	culture	in	terms	of	a	supposed	distinction	between	individual	and	social	learning.	That	said,	the	problems	inherent	in	assuming	any	simple	individual/social	learning	distinction	are	already	well	understood	by	some	researchers	working	on	cultural	evolution.	Perreault	et	al	[42]	proposed	a	formal	model	of	the	evolution	of	learning	a	few	years	ago	that	understood	both	‘social	learning’	and	‘individual	learning’	as	consequences	of	a	single	(Bayesian)	inferential	process.	While	denying	a	distinction	between	social	and	individual	learning	in	terms	of	underlying	cognitive	process,	that	model	remained	committed	to	a	distinction	between	‘social’	and	‘nonsocial’	cues	regarding	the	state	of	the	environment.	Other	forms	of	work	have	cast	further	doubt	on	the	notion	that	we	can	easily	determine	when	the	information	an	individual	acquires	is	‘social’	in	provenance.	For	example,	in	a	useful	paper	on	learning	in	chimpanzees,	Hobaiter	and	colleagues	looked	at	the	spread	of	a	new	behaviour,	which	they	call	‘Moss	Sponging’,	in	a	community	of	wild	chimps.	[43]	Previously,	these	chimps	has	used	‘sponges’	made	from	chewed	up	leaves,	in	order	to	soak	up	water	which	they	would	then	squeeze	into	their	mouths	and	drink.	Some	chimps	then	began	to	make	these	sponges	out	of	moss	instead.	They	note	that	‘One	individual	[whom	they	called	‘KW’]	acquired	moss-sponging	without	any	evidence	of	first	observing	another	individual…	However,	KW	acquired	[moss	sponging]	after	re-using	another	chimpanzee’s	sponge	that	contained	moss,	suggesting	social	learning	mediated	through	the	products	of	the	moss-sponging	behavior….’	In	other	words,	while	KW	did	not	rely	on	any	direct	interactions	with	other	chimps	in	her	discovery	that	moss	could	be	used	as	a	sponge	and,	at	least	based	on	what	the	authors	report	here,	simply	learned	for	herself	(based	on	what	she	had	found	around	her)	that	this	was	indeed	a	good	alternative	sponging	technique,	the	very	fact	that	moss	sponges	were	lying	around	her	environment	helped	to	explain	how	she	was	able	to	acquire	this	behaviour.	The	authors	mention	this	example	as	part	of	what	they	
describe	as	‘a	growing	literature	that	refutes	a	strong	distinction	between	individual	and	social	learning.’		Similarly,	and	again	focusing	on	learning	in	primates,	Fragaszy	describes	a	hybrid	category	of	what	she	revealingly	calls,	‘socially	biased	individual	learning’.	[44]	Here	again,	an	individual	learns	by	interacting	with	her	environment,	but	the	environment	itself	is	‘biased’—in	other	words,	structured	in	a	manner	that	makes	some	learning	outcomes	easier	than	they	would	otherwise	be—by	prior	social	action.	She	cites	a	paper	by	Humle	et	al.,	which	explains	how	young	chimps	in	Bossou,	Guinea,	learn	to	dip	for	ants.	[45]	Again,	the	availability	of	discarded	tools	is	important:	‘[I]nfants’	initial	efforts	to	practice	dipping	were	enabled	by	the	availability	of	pre-used	(and	hence,	pre-selected	as	suitable)	tools.’	[44,	46]		In	a	recent	overview	of	work	on	cultural	evolution,	Joseph	Henrich	begins	by	characterizing	individual	and	social	learning:		 Throughout	this	book,	social	learning	refers	to	any	time	an	individual’s	learning	is	influenced	by	others,	and	it	includes	many	different	kinds	of	psychological	processes.	Individual	learning	refers	to	situations	in	which	individuals	learn	by	observing	or	interacting	directly	with	their	environment,	and	can	range	from	calculating	the	best	time	to	hunt	by	observing	when	certain	prey	emerge,	to	engaging	in	trial-and-error	learning	with	different	digging	tools.	So,	individual	learning	too	captures	many	different	psychological	processes.	[11]		As	we	have	seen,	this	way	of	characterizing	things	means	that	social	learning	and	individual	learning	are	not	exclusive:	an	individual	can	learn	by	interacting	directly	with	its	environment—hence	a	case	of	‘individual	learning’—but	in	an	environment	that	has	itself	been	influenced	by	others,	hence	‘social	learning’.	In	other	words,	it	is	not	merely	the	case	that	‘individual’	and	‘social’	learning	both	involve	‘many	different	psychological	processes’.	Rather,	if	we	focus	solely	on	psychological	events,	they	may	involve	precisely	the	same	processes.	That	said,	
Henrich’s	immediate	follow-up	indicates	that	he	is	aware	of	this	consequence,	and	is	untroubled	by	it:	‘Thus,	the	least	sophisticated	forms	of	social	learning	occur	simply	as	a	by-product	of	being	around	others,	and	engaging	in	individual	learning.’		These	considerations	voiced	from	within	the	cultural	evolution	community	can	help	us	to	understand	why	it	is	that	some	social	anthropologists	have	dismissed	the	very	idea	of	culture.	Christina	Toren,	for	example,	takes:		 …the	radical	view	that	one	can	conceive	of	all	aspects	of	the	world,	including	crucially	all	dimensions	of	human	being,	indeed	of	all	living	things,	as	historically	constituted.	This	perspective	does	away	with	ideas	of	‘human	nature’	and	‘culture’	as	analytical	categories,	but	it	does	not	entail	any	denial	of	the	science	of	biology	and	its	ever	more	remarkable	technological	advances.	[47]		We	began	by	noting,	along	with	the	mainstream	of	cultural	evolutionary	theorists,	that	much	of	what	we	know	we	learn	from	others.	We	then	noted,	along	with	more	reflective	thinkers	in	that	same	cultural	evolution	community,	that	there	are	ways	for	the	collective	actions	of	one	generation	to	enhance,	facilitate,	or	otherwise	influence	what	further	generations	learn	in	ways	that	do	not	require	any	special	form	of	learning:	the	collective	structuring	of	the	environment	can	also	do	the	trick.	And	then,	once	we	allow	that	‘culture’	might	encompass	that	which	is	explained	via	learning	in	a	collectively	structured	environment—in	other	words,	the	traditions	sustained	and	explained	by	the	social	actions	of	previous	generations—it	seems	we	have	no	particular	grounds	to	exclude	from	the	scope	of	‘culture’	the	ways	in	which	the	social	actions	of	past	generations	enhance	or	facilitate	downstream	development	through	mechanisms	other	than	learning.	Once	we	reach	that	point,	though,	the	culture	concept	itself	has	become	empty.		Laland	at	al	remark	that:		
We…inherit	a	world	of	our	making,	complete	with	dogs,	wheat,	dairy	cows,	nectarines,	and	countless	genetically	modified	types	of	grapes	and	without	dodos,	woolly	mammoths,	and	the	numerous	other	species	left	extinct	by	human	activities.	This	is	both	our	ecological	and	our	cultural	inheritance.	[41]		There	are	myriad	ways	in	which	the	collective	actions	of	previous	generations	influence	how	we	develop:	indeed,	at	the	limit,	social	facts	about	how	populations	are	divided	into	heterogeneous	sub-groups,	and	other	such	demographic	facts,	can	affect	who	reproduces	with	whom,	and	ultimately	the	sorts	of	genotypes	that	come	to	exist	in	future	generations.	In	that	sense,	genotypic	combinations,	and	their	downstream	developmental	effects,	might	also	be	considered	elements	of	‘culture’.	That	is	precisely	why	people	like	Toren	deny	the	value	of	the	culture	concept,	and	it	is	also	precisely	why	the	Developmental	Systems	Theorists	have	expressed	scepticism	about	our	abilities	to	pull	nature	and	culture	apart.	The	culture	concept	is	so	elastic	that	it	threatens	to	stretch	much	too	far:	far	enough	to	encompass	all	aspects	of	human	and	animal	behaviour	that	owe	themselves,	in	some	way	or	another,	to	the	collective	practices	of	earlier	generations.		Once	again	though,	it	is	(perhaps)	surprising	to	see	how	robust	work	in	cultural	evolution	is	in	the	face	of	these	worries	about	whether—and	how—we	might	decide	what	counts	as	‘culture’.	Kim	Sterelny,	for	example,	stresses	in	his	recent	work	on	what	he	calls	‘apprentice	learning’	the	ways	in	which	novice	learners	can	enjoy	very	significant	epistemic	leg-ups	in	much	the	same	way	as	Hobaiter	et	al’s	chimps:	by	spending	time	in	environments	rich	with	the	detritus	of	an	adept’s	activities,	novices	end	up	having	access	to	felicitously	prepared	raw	materials,	half-constructed	elements	of	completed	tools	and	so	forth.	[10]	The	consequence	is	that	they	learn	for	themselves	they	learn	in	ways	that	are	already	significantly	‘scaffolded’.	For	Sterelny,	this	is	part	of	a	natural	historical	narrative	in	which	increasingly	elaborate	forms	of	teaching,	and	the	maintenance	of	large	store-houses	of	know-how,	emerge	from	more	rudimentary	beginnings.		
While	Sterelny’s	work	falls	squarely	within	the	general	cultural	evolutionary	project	of	asking	what	processes	underpin	our	accumulation	and	maintenance	of	bodies	of	knowledge,	and	how	and	why	those	varied	processes	emerged	over	time,	that	project	does	not	require	that	we	give	any	principled	answer	to	the	question	‘what	is	culture?’.	It	is	simply	not	a	threat	to	Sterelny’s	work	that	we	might	want	to	count	those	simple	forms	of	scaffolded	learning	as	facilitating	‘culture’;	and	it	would	not	be	a	problem	if	we	began	to	be	convinced	that	ultimately	there	is	no	good	answer	to	the	question	of	how	to	pick	out	‘culture’	from	the	broader	mess	of	ways	in	which	social	interactions	help	to	explain	the	reasonably	reliable	transmission	of	forms	of	behaviour,	modes	of	thinking,	and	so	forth.		
Getting	Back	to	Earth		If	we	set	ourselves	the	very	general	project	of	asking	what	is	nature,	what	is	culture,	and	how	we	should	distinguish	the	two,	then	we	will	inevitably	fail.	Developmental	Systems	Theory,	and	the	niche	construction	perspective,	remind	us	that	there	are	many	ways	in	which	the	collective	practices	of	parental	generations—of	humans,	and	of	other	species,	too—can	influence	offspring	generations,	and	hence	that	simple	distinctions	between	‘individual’	and	‘social’	learning	are	often	inadequate.	They	also	remind	us	that,	if	we	wanted	to,	it	would	not	be	an	outrage	to	attribute	a	form	of	‘culture’	to	very	‘low’	forms	of	animal	life,	even	to	plants:	for	here,	too,	the	activities	of	earlier	generations	in	modifying	environments	end	up	affecting	the	manner	in	which	later	generations	develop.	These	very	abstract	worries	still	leave	intact	the	project	of	asking	how	different	forms	of	learning,	and	how	different	contexts	for	learning,	first	emerged	in	our	own	species,	how	they	differ	in	the	capacities	they	confer	on	populations,	and	why	they	persist.	In	that	respect,	too,	the	cultural	evolutionary	project	survives	any	scepticism	we	might	have	about	‘culture’,	and	whether	‘culture’	is	best	thought	of	as	a	moving	evolutionary	target.			We	can	offer,	then,	an	irenic	resolution	of	the	debate	between	sceptics	of	the	cultural	evolutionary	project	and	its	proponents.	Social	anthropologists,	among	
others,	are	right	to	cast	doubt	on	the	propriety	of	distinctions	between	nature	and	culture,	between	individual	and	social	learning,	and	ultimately	they	are	right	to	point	out	the	potential	of	the	very	idea	of	‘culture’	to	encourage	an	overly	narrow	approach	to	the	question	of	how	such	things	as	traditions,	bodies	of	practice	and	so	forth	are	sustained	from	one	time	to	another.	But	the	very	same	concerns	that	motivate	these	worries	about	the	culture	concept	are	also	beginning	to	inform	cultural	evolutionary	investigations	themselves.		We	can	also	suggest	an	ironic	resolution	to	these	debates.	As	we	have	seen,	it	is	true	of	all	species	that	the	interactions	of	organisms	of	one	generation	leave	behind	a	structured	set	of	developmental	resources	that	combine	in	later	generations	to	bring	about	new	organisms,	whose	dispositions	resemble	those	of	the	previous	generation.	These	are	the	sorts	of	themes	long	suggested	in	social	scientific	contexts	by	thinkers	such	as	Bourdieu	and	Vygotsky.	[48,	49]	In	the	most	liberal	sense,	then,	social	relations	are	always	responsible	for	patterns	of	reproduction,	and	any	choice	over	exactly	which	of	these	relational	processes	we	choose	to	call	‘culture’	will	be	to	some	degree	arbitrary.	At	one	extreme	we	have	rare	processes	such	as	teaching,	in	which	demonstrators	model	behaviours—often	in	unusually	slow,	segmented	or	exaggerated	ways—with	the	explicit	goal	of	assisting	novices	in	acquiring	skills	or	know-how.	Towards	the	other	extreme,	we	have	those	much	more	widespread	cases	of	‘socially	biased	individual	learning’,	where	the	activities	of	one	group	of	organisms	give	rise	to	by-products	that	enhance	the	learning	of	others.	In	answering	the	question	‘What	is	to	count	as	“culture”?’	we	must	make	choices	as	investigators;	the	answer	is	not	something	given	to	us	by	the	world	itself.	It	turns	out	that	cultural	evolutionists,	for	the	most	part,	use	‘culture’	in	ways	that	are	reasonable	given	their	aims:	they	understand,	for	example,	that	learning	from	others	is	not	the	only	way	in	which	traditions	can	be	sustained	across	generations;	and	they	understand	that	our	collective	ability	to	sustain	elaborate	bodies	of	know-how	depends	on	a	very	wide	variety	of	processes.	This	fact	becomes	clear	when	we	take	time	to	examine	the	pragmatic	goals	and	explanatory	practices	of	cultural	evolutionists	themselves.		
In	recent	years,	some	prominent	social	anthropologists	have	urged	that	we	should	not	dismiss	the	ontologies	of	alien	communities	simply	because	they	differ	from	our	own;	more	specifically,	we	should	not	try	to	accommodate	or	explain	those	alien	ontologies	by	showing	how	they	might	arise	as	their	projections	onto	the	true	world—i.e.	the	world	as	we	understand	it.	Instead,	those	who	advocate	an	‘ontological	turn’	have	stressed	the	need	to	take	these	others	more	‘seriously’.	The	variety	of	ways	in	which	we	might	inadvertently	not	take	alternative	ontologies	with	suitable	seriousness	is	a	theme	in	the	work	of	people	like	Edouardo	Viveiros	de	Castro,	and	Martin	Hollbrad,	for	example.	[50,	51]	As	this	mode	of	thinking	predicts,	when	the	natives	in	question	are	cultural	evolutionists	themselves,	we	can	also	see	how	the	particular	manners	in	which	they	construct	‘culture’	can	be	justified,	by	taking	their	practical	lives—their	investigative	and	explanatory	lives—seriously,	too.		
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